

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 169248

62

ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00

SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /082 R

DRAFTED BY OSD:LBIRD

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:ACFLOYD

OSD/ISA:LMICHAEL

JCS:RMCCANN

PM/DCA:CFLOWERREE

EUR/RPM:GCHRISTIANSON

C:WSHINN

NSC:MHIGGINS

ACDA:THIRSCHFELD

S/S :FORTIZ

----- 102403

O 180008Z JUL 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T STATE 169248

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT:MBFR: OPTION III SUPPLEMENTARY UNDERSTANDINGS

REF: A. STATE 156821 B. MBFR VIENNA 0355

C. MBFR VIENNA 0354 D. LONDON 10800

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 169248

DELIVER DURING WORKING HOURS.

1. THERE FOLLOWS BELOW A REVISED ILLUSTRATIVE DRAFT OF
INTERNAL ALLIED UNDERSTANDINGS ON OPTION III. THIS DRAFT

WHICH TAKES ACCOUNT OF FRG AND UK COMMENTS ON OUR INITIAL PAPER (REF A) SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO BONN AND LONDON AUTHORITIES FOR USE DURING 18 JULY TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS. MISSION AND US DEL MBFR MAY PASS THIS NEW TEXT TO CORRESPONDING DELEGATIONS IN BRUSSELS AND VIENNA. IT SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO UK AND FRG OFFICIALS THAT WE REGARD THIS AS A VEHICLE FOR DISCUSSION RATHER THAN AS A FINAL TEXT.

2. RE PARA 10 REF B, WE CAN ACCEPT AS BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION EITHER "COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING" OR "COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING" AS THE EXPRESSION USED BY THE WEST IN REFERRING TO THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS. THIS TEXT HAS BEEN REVISED ACCORDINGLY.

3. WITH REFERENCE TO REF D. PARA 6, WE CONTINUE TO FEEL IT IS LOGICAL TO LIMIT SPECIFICALLY ALL SOVIET MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

4. BEGIN TEXT: ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF ALLIED POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN MBFR.

I. CONTENT.

1. THESE UNDERSTANDINGS SUPPLEMENT COUNCIL'S GUIDANCE TO AHG AUTHORIZING ALLIED NEGOTIATORS TO PROPOSE REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN EXCHANGE FOR EASTERN AGREEMENT TO ALLIED PHASE I OBJECTIVES. THEY RECORD INTERNAL ALLIED AGREEMENTS AS TO ADDITIONAL ASPECTS OF ALLIED POSITION.

2. IN REACHING THESE UNDERSTANDINGS, ALLIES HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES EXPRESSED IN (DESIGNATION OF DOCUMENT).

II. OBJECTIVES.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 169248

3. IN ORDER FOR WEST TO ACCEPT A PHASE I AGREEMENT PROVIDING FOR OPTION III REDUCTIONS, THE SOVIETS MUST AGREE TO WITHDRAW A SOVIET TANK ARMY IN PHASE I AND EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST COMMIT THEMSELVES TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER WITH WEST AND MUST ACCEPT IN PRINCIPLE THAT PHASE II AGREEMENT WILL PROVIDE FOR REDUCTIONS TO ATTAIN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING ON GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA. IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT, DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL COLLECTIVELY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AGREE IN PHASE II ON WHATEVER FURTHER REDUCTIONS WILL BE NEEDED TO REACH PARITY IN THE TOTAL OF GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER FOR BOTH SIDES. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD DESCRIBE LEVEL OF THEIR COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING OBJECTIVE, ILLUSTRATIVELY, AS

APPROXIMATELY 900,000 MEN.

III. REDUCTIONS

4. THE U.S. NUCLEAR REDUCTION PACKAGE WOULD CONSIST OF:

- 1,000 U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS;
- 36 U.S. PERSHING SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS;
- 54 U.S. NUCLEAR CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT.

5. U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS. THE 1,000 WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THOSE AVAILABLE FOR USE BY U.S. UNITS.

THESE REDUCTIONS WILL NOT REDUCE THE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS SUPPORTING A PLANNED OR EXISTING PROGRAM OF COOPERATION (POC). IF, HOWEVER, DUE TO A PLANNED REDUCTION OR PHASEOUT OF AN ALLIED NUCLEAR SYSTEM (E.G., HONEST JOHN AND SERGEANT), POC SUPPORT FOR THAT SYSTEM WAS REDUCED BEFORE THE OPTION III REDUCTIONS WERE IMPLEMENTED, THE ASSOCIATED WARHEADS WOULD, AS THEY BECOME AVAILABLE, NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED PART OF A POC AND WOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION AMONG THE 1,000 U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS OFFERED FOR REDUCTION IN OPTION III, WITHDRAWALS WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH A MANNER THAT SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 169248

WILL BE MAINTAINED IN ALL EQUIPMENT MODES. TYPES OF WARHEADS AND NUMBERS OF EACH TYPE OF WARHEAD TO BE WITHDRAWN WILL NOT BE SPECIFIED TO THE EAST.

6. U.S. NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. U.S. AIRCRAFT TO BE REDUCED SHOULD BE DEFINED AS 54 U.S. NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT. SPECIFIC MODELS OF THE F-4 THAT WOULD BE CANDIDATES FOR REDUCTION ARE THE F-4C, F-4D, AND F-4E SINCE AT LEAST SOME AIRCRAFT OF THESE MODELS ARE PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING A NUCLEAR WEAPON WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. RF-4C AIRCRAFT, WHICH ARE NOT NUCLEAR CAPABLE, WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED AMONG THE 54 AIRCRAFT. THE WEST SHOULD NOT SPECIFY THE NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TO BE REDUCED BY MODEL IN ORDER TO AVOID A PRECEDENT FOR SUBCEILINGS ON PARTICULAR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS.

7. SOVIET TANKS. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY (FIVE DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS INCLUDING EQUIPMENT). REDUCTIONS WOULD INCLUDE 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1700 SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THOUGH CERTAIN SOVIET TANK ARMIES IN THE NGA MAY HAVE LESS THAN 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO EXCLUDE WITHDRAWAL OF ANY SOVIET TANK ARMY IF

SUFFICIENT ADDITIONAL UNITS WERE WITHDRAWN TO SATISFY THE FOREGOING REQUIREMENTS. SOVIET "MAIN BATTLE TANKS" WOULD BE DEFINED BY THOSE MODELS (E.G. T-54/55, T-62, T-10, ETC.) IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD NOT SEEK TO FURTHER SPECIFY THE REDUCTION, SUCH AS SPECIFYING THE MIX OF MODELS IN THE TANK ARMY OR REQUIRING THAT ALL REDUCTIONS HAVE TO BE TAKEN IN TERMS OF ONE SPECIFIC MODEL. TO DO SO WOULD ESTABLISH AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT WITH RESPECT TO INHIBITING OR REQUIRING REORGANIZATION OF FORCES. THE U.S. COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH CONSTRAINTS ON ITS OWN FORCES. FINALLY, WE WOULD NOT WANT TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A RATIONALE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THEIR ATTEMPTS TO SPECIFY TYPES OF

WARHEADS OR NUMBERS OF SPECIFIC F-4 AIRCRAFT MODELS WE WOULD REDUCE.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 169248

8. U.S. AND SOVIET MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT SPECIFIED FOR REDUCTION SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN TO HOMELANDS.

IV. LIMITATIONS

9. U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS. WARHEAD LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF "U.S. NUCLEAR WARHEADS" AND NO LIMIT SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON SPECIFIC SUBTYPES IN ORDER TO RETAIN FREEDOM TO MIX AMONG WARHEAD TYPES.

10. U.S. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS. SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHER LIMITATIONS WOULD APPLY TO LAUNCHERS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF A RANGE GREATER THAN 500 KMS. THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF SHORTER RANGE AND THE NUMBER OF MISSILES OF ANY RANGE WOULD NOT BE LIMITED.

11. U.S. NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. ALLIES SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY LIMITATION ON U.S. CONVENTIONAL (I.E. NON-NUCLEAR CAPABLE) COMBAT AIRCRAFT. IN RESPONSE TO EXPECTED SOVIET DEMANDS FOR LIMITATION ON ALL U.S. COMBAT AIRCRAFT REMAINING IN THE AREA, ALLIES SHOULD RESPOND THAT LIMITATION WOULD APPLY ONLY TO "US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT" WHICH WOULD BE DEFINED TO BE ALL AIRCRAFT OF SPECIFIC MODELS (E.G. F-4C, F-4D, F-4E) IN THE AREA, IF AT LEAST SOME AIRCRAFT OF THESE MODELS ARE PHYSICALLY CAPABLE OF DELIVERING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHOUT FURTHER MODIFICATION. ALLIES WOULD WANT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD TO REFLECT IN SOME WAY THE MODELS COVERED BY THE LIMITATION. THIS COULD BE IN THE FORM OF A LIST OF MODELS WHICH BOTH SIDES AGREE ARE COVERED, OR IT COULD TAKE SOME OTHER FORM. THE LIMIT ON U.S.

NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE A LIMIT ON OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF SUCH U.S. AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THERE WOULD BE NO SUBCEILINGS ON PARTICULAR NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTIONS ON U.S. UNITS.

12. SOVIET TANKS. LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET TANKS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF SOVIET MAIN
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 169248

BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION. ALLIES WOULD WANT THE NEGOTIATING RECORD TO REFLECT IN SOME WAY THE MODELS OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS COVERED BY THE LIMITATION, E.G., T-54/55, T-62, T-10, ETC. LIMITATIONS WILL ALSO COVER OTHER MODELS OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS

IF AND WHEN SUCH MODELS ENTER THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

13. LIMITATIONS ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE TANK ARMY. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO WITHDRAW AN ENTIRE TANK ARMY AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 7, LIMITATIONS WOULD NOT BE IMPOSED ON TANK ARMIES PER SE OR ON ARMAMENTS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY OTHER THAN MAIN BATTLE TANKS. LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OR COMPOSITION OF SOVIET TANK ARMIES COULD PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH A RATIONALE TO JUSTIFY THEIR ATTEMPTS TO SPECIFY THE NUMBER AND COMPOSITION OF U.S. UNITS WITHDRAWN. THE ALLIES CANNOT ACCEPT LIMITS ON U.S. UNITS BECAUSE SUCH LIMITS WOULD CONSTRAIN FORCE RESTRUCTURING AND OTHER EFFICIENCY MEASURES. SEEKING TO LIMIT FROGS AND SCUDS WOULD OPEN THE DOOR TO CONSTRAINTS ON EQUIVALENT WESTERN SYSTEMS SUCH AS LANCE AND POSSIBLY NUCLEAR CAPABLE ARTILLERY, AND WOULD RISK EXPANDING THE NEGOTIATIONS INTO BROADER TRADES OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS THAN IS ENVISIONED IN OPTION III.

14. U.S. TANKS. IF ANY LIMITS ON U.S. TANKS SHOULD BE AGREED TO, THEY SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO MAIN BATTLE TANKS (E.G., M60, M60A1, M60A2) NOW IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE LIMITATION WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE RESIDUAL OVERALL LEVEL OF U.S. MAIN-BATTLE TANKS, AND WOULD IMPOSE NO SUBCEILING ON PARTICULAR TANK MODELS. ANY LIMITATION ON U.S. TANKS SHOULD LEAVE THE U.S. FREE TO RESTORE ITS DEFICIENT TANK STOCKS TO EARLIER AUTHORIZED LEVELS AND ALLOW FURTHER MODEST INCREASES BEYOND THE RESTORED LEVELS.

15. MANPOWER. A NUMERICAL LIMITATION SHOULD BE PLACED ON THE TOTAL OF SOVIET AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT THE LEVEL REACHED AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL IN PHASE I OF 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS.
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 169248

THE ALLIES WOULD AGREE TO A LIMITATION ON THE TOTAL OF US AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AT THE LEVEL REACHED AFTER WITHDRAWAL IN PHASE I OF 29,000 US GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL. EXCEPTIONS WOULD BE AGREED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACCOMMODATING TEMPORARY FLUCTUATIONS CAUSED BY NORMAL REPLACEMENT, TRAINING (INCLUDING EXERCISES), TEMPORARY DUTY, AND LEAVE.

16. (WHEN THE QUESTION OF SUBCEILINGS WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING IS DECIDED, A STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT WILL BE INSERTED HERE.)

17. FORCE IMPROVEMENTS. ALLIES SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY PROVISIONS IN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INHIBIT QUALITATIVE

IMPROVEMENTS OR ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT OF CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS WITH FOLLOW-ON SYSTEMS.

18. LIMITS ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON NON-U.S. ARMAMENTS OR ON AGGREGATE ALLIED ARMAMENTS; THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON NON-U.S. ALLIES ARE THOSE APPLIED TO AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. IF THE EAST ASKS FOR SUCH LIMITS ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT SUCH LIMITS ON ALLIED ARMAMENTS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

19. FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS. SOME FORM OF FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENT WILL BE NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH ISSUES RELATED TO INTRODUCTION OF NEW MODELS OF EQUIPMENT OF THE TYPE CONSTRAINED. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD AVOID INDICATING ANY PREFERENCE FOR A SPECIFIC TYPE OF ARRANGEMENT UNTIL AN ALLIANCE DECISION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THOSE OTHER ISSUES ARISING OUT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT REQUIRE FOLLOW-ON ARRANGEMENTS, HAS BEEN MADE.

V. AIR MANPOWER

20. THE ALLIES MAY ULTIMATELY WANT TO MODIFY THE ABOVE GUIDANCE (SEE PARA 15) TO PERMIT LIMITED U.S. AIR
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 169248

MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I TO ALLOW ALLIES TO TAKE "CREDIT" FOR U.S. AIRMEN WHO MAY BE WITHDRAWN WITH U.S. F-4 AIRCRAFT IN OPTION III. THE ALLIES DO NOT WANT TO COMMIT THEMSELVES AT THIS TIME TO ANY AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OR ENGAGE EAST ON THIS TOPIC UNTIL AFTER THEY HAVE RECEIVED CONSIDERED EASTERN REACTION TO OPTION III

PROPOSAL. IF ANY U.S. AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ARE
ULTIMATELY AGREED TO IN PHASE I THEY WOULD:

- BE ON STRICTLY VOLUNTARY BASIS (MINIMIZING ANY
PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II);
- BE LIMITED TO SMALL PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REDUCTIONS
(SO AS TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE
REDUCTIONS);
- NOT REQUIRE A REDUCTION IN PRESENT LEVEL OF U.S.
TACTICAL FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN AREA (EXCEPT FOR
F-4S INCLUDED IN OPTION III). END TEXT. KISSINGER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENT DRAFT, TEXT, INSTRUCTIONS, OPTION III, AMENDMENTS, BRIEFING MATERIALS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 JUL 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE169248
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: OSD:LBIRD
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750247-1095
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197507105/baaaappf.tel
Line Count: 338
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2003 by lzenbel0>; APPROVED <06 OCT 2003 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: NATO
BONN
LONDON INFO MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006